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LLMs can be Dangerous Reasoners: Analyzing-based Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models
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The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) has brought impressive advancements across various tasks. However, despite these achievements, LLMs still pose inherent safety risks, especially in the context of jailbreak attacks. Most existing jailbreak methods follow an input-level manipulation paradigm to bypass safety mechanisms. Yet, as alignment techniques improve, such attacks are becoming increasingly detectable. In this work, we identify an underexplored threat vector: the model's internal reasoning process, which can be manipulated to elicit harmful outputs in a more stealthy way. To explore this overlooked attack surface, we propose a novel black-box jailbreak attack method, Analyzing-based Jailbreak (ABJ). ABJ comprises two independent attack paths: textual and visual reasoning attacks, which exploit the model's multimodal reasoning capabilities to bypass safety mechanisms, comprehensively exposing vulnerabilities in its reasoning chain. We conduct extensive experiments on ABJ across various open-source and closed-source LLMs, VLMs, and RLMs. In particular, ABJ achieves high attack success rate (ASR) (82.1% on GPT-4o-2024-11-20) with exceptional attack efficiency (AE) among all target models, showcasing its remarkable attack effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency. Our work reveals a new type of safety risk and highlights the urgent need to mitigate implicit vulnerabilities in the model's reasoning process.
Forward citations
Cited by 9 Pith papers
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HalluProp infers per-agent and system-level hallucination risk in multi-agent LLMs before interaction via role–query misalignment, topology-aware propagation, and differentiable Noisy-OR aggregation.
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SafeSpec: Fast and Safe LLM via Dynamic Reflective Sampling
SafeSpec integrates a latent safety head into speculative LLM decoding with rollback and reflective multi-sampling, cutting attack success rates 15% on Qwen3-32B while retaining 2.06x speedup on normal workloads.
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SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses
A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.
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LLM in the Middle: A Systematic Review of Threats and Mitigations to Real-World LLM-based Systems
A systematic review that categorizes LLM threats, severity scores, and mitigations across development and operation life cycles and multiple deployment scenarios.
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PREE: Towards Harmless and Adaptive Fingerprint Editing in Large Language Models via Knowledge Prefix Enhancement
PREE edits a tiny fraction of an LLM's weights so the model answers fake facts when triggered by specially selected prefix phrases, enabling robust ownership verification.
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Layer-Wise Perturbations via Sparse Autoencoders for Adversarial Text Generation
Sparse autoencoder activation perturbation (SFPF) applied on top of existing jailbreak prompts raises attack success rate on Qwen3-32B, but with no defense evaluation and weak reproducibility.
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Beyond Surface-Level Detection: Towards Cognitive-Driven Defense Against Jailbreak Attacks via Meta-Operations Reasoning
A jailbreak defense that reasons about hidden manipulations in attack prompts, trained with supervised fine-tuning plus entropy-guided reinforcement learning, generalizes to attacks never seen in training.
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Safety at Scale: A Comprehensive Survey of Large Model and Agent Safety
A comprehensive survey that taxonomizes safety threats to large models and agents, reviews defenses and benchmarks, and outlines open challenges.
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