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Every paper Pith has read. Search by title, abstract, or pith.
527 papers in cs.GT · page 9
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Only highest-value bidder competes to raise ad value
On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders
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Distilled model speeds uncertainty estimates tenfold in RTA interception
Uncertainty Modeling for Multi-Objective RTA Interception with Distillation Acceleration
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Timestamp scheduling steers traffic to efficient routes without tolls
Controlling Traffic without Tolls: A Non-Monetary Framework for Autonomous Intersections
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Matching deliberation lets tournaments reach distortion 3
Deliberation via Matching
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Standard utility models fail for most budget voters
What Are People's Actual Utility Functions in Budget Aggregation?
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Regularization inside policy gradients drives monotonic convergence to Nash equilibria
NashPG: A Policy Gradient Method with Iteratively Refined Regularization for Finding Nash Equilibria
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Resource updates and dynamic entry raise MEC co-investment payoff
Co-Investment in Mobile Edge Computing with Infrastructure Update and Dynamic Participation
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Adaptive agents sustain persistent market overpricing
The Invisible Handshake: Persistent Overpricing by Adaptive Market Agents
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Three axioms fix Shapley values on weighted acyclic multigraphs
M\"obius transforms and Shapley values for vector-valued functions on weighted directed acyclic multigraphs
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New algorithms beat majority voting for LLM answer aggregation
Beyond Majority Voting: LLM Aggregation by Leveraging Higher-Order Information
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Latency Incentives Cluster Ethereum Validators Geographically
Geographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
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Distributed algorithm meets QoS targets in tug-of-war games
Choose Your Battles: Distributed Learning Over Multiple Tug of War Games
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Election control problems classified for approximability
Approximating Electoral Control Problems
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User reselling game in Open RAN reaches unique equilibrium
A User-to-User Resource Reselling Game in Open RAN with Buffer Rollover
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MinMaxP is the only truthful mechanism beating 2-approx with predictions
Strategyproof Facility Location with Prediction: Minimizing the Maximum Cost
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Small Uncertainty Stalls Network Consensus
The Price of Uncertainty for Social Consensus
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Autoregressive generator shades bids without unimodal assumptions
Generative Bid Shading in Real-Time Bidding Advertising
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Framework lifts FPTAS from algorithms to contracts without demand queries
An Algorithm-to-Contract Framework without Demand Queries
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Marker anchors stabilize coevolution in mixed games
Governing Strategic Dynamics: Equilibrium Stabilization via Divergence-Driven Control
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Exact MMS exists for additive valuations on graphs
Exact and approximate maximin share allocations in multi-graphs
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Cooperative games built from two basic two-player games
The algebraic structures of social organizations: the operad of cooperative games
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Infinite lex products preserve positionality in games
Infinite lexicographic products of positional objectives
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Higher-order rules reach isolated mixed Nash equilibria
Higher-Order Uncoupled Learning Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
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Adaptive queries reach near-optimal diversity with linear candidate queries
Diverse Committees with Incomplete or Inaccurate Approval Ballots
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Dynamic penalties reduce shill bidding profits in blockchain auctions
Shill Bidding Prevention in Decentralized Auctions Using Smart Contracts
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Smart contract picks joint-profit-max trade to stop no-trade collapse in repo deals
A Smart-Contract to Resolve Multiple Equilibrium in Intermediated Trade
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Sequential group assessment is order-independent for most semivalues
Sequential Elimination and Union Shapley Value for Group Assessment in Coalitional Games
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Strategic annotators need golden questions of high certainty
Incentivizing High-Quality Human Annotations with Golden Questions
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Dual descent bidding controls regret in first-price auctions
Adaptive Bidding Policies for First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints under Non-stationarity
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Compositional framework analyzes blockchain incentive compatibility
A Composable Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchains
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Online edge-weighted matching ratio lies between 0.662 and 0.663
Edge-weighted Online Stochastic Matching Under Jaillet-Lu LP
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Neural SDEs learn mean-field games from data
Neural Mean-Field Games: Extending Mean-Field Game Theory with Neural Stochastic Differential Equations
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Competitive disclosure keeps inefficiency within constant factor
The Price of Competitive Information Disclosure
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New dimension pins leader regret in Stackelberg games
Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games
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Fixed-price trade achieves tight T to the 2/3 regret
Tight Regret Bounds for Fixed-Price Bilateral Trade
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Sequential price quotes let networks pay users to keep LLM data
Quotation-Based Data Retention Mechanism for Data Privacy in LLM-Empowered Network Services
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Pareto-optimal allocation lets envy be fixed by moving few items
Fair and efficient allocation of indivisible items under category constraints
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SPE verification in PSPACE but Nash needs EXPTIME
Verifying Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Probabilistic Concurrent Game Systems
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Black-box reduction yields online bi-criteria bandits with sublinear bounds
A Resilience Framework for Bi-Criteria Combinatorial Optimization with Bandit Feedback
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Condorcet cycles block reward-based LLM alignment almost surely
Statistical Impossibility and Possibility of Aligning LLMs with Human Preferences: From Condorcet Paradox to Nash Equilibrium
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Low-rank graphon estimates control welfare loss in games
Low-Rank Graphon Estimation: Theory and Applications to Graphon Games
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Payments recover agent utilities in polynomial rounds for any no-regret play
Learning a Game by Paying the Agents
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Algorithms solve social welfare maximization under uncertain approvals
Social Welfare Maximization in Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty
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Quantile valuations tie welfare complexity to allocation balance
Maximum Welfare Allocations under Quantile Valuations
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Interim model matches ex ante inside training but beats it outside
Learning Bayesian Game Families, with Application to Mechanism Design
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Two-stage payments required to maximize profit on uncertain services
How to Sell a Service with Uncertain Outcomes
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Bayesian agents eliminate log-regret learners from markets
Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners
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Linear contracts close annotator performance gap at rate 1/(I n)
How Humans Help LLMs: Assessing and Incentivizing Human Preference Annotators
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k-additive surrogates yield exact Shapley estimates
Shapley Value Approximation Based on k-Additive Games
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Two methods balance influence and proportional diversity in node selection
Proportional Selection in Networks